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Abstract: In 2009, Lin et al. proposed a digital multi-signature scheme based on the concepts of generalized conic curves over Zn .
They claimed that the multi-signature scheme is well secured and the forgery attack is infeasible on it. Unfortunately, three weaknesses
on their proposed multi-signature have been observed and it has been shown that an attacker can compute the secret pairs of all signers
using the technique to solve the linear Diophantine equation, a malicious signer can generate a forged signature based on the signatures
of other signers, called inside forgery attack, which is very difficult to disproof by the verifier. Also an outsider can compute a forged
signature against the valid multi-signature, may be termed as outsider forgery attack.
Keywords: Conic curve, Digital multi-signature, Linear Diophantine equation, Euclid’s algorithm, Forgery attack

1 Introduction
Digital signature is a mathematical tool, used in
cryptography to provide authentication, integrity and
non-repudiation properties of electronic message on the
internet. The signer formulates a digital signature using
his/her private key on a digital message such that a public
verifier can verify the message and signature using
signer’s public key, but anyone can’t forge the signature
on any other message. Most of the situations, the signer is
generally a single person however, in some cases a
message is to be signed or approved by multiple number
of signers. In such case, a strategy could be put into
practice by having a separate digital signature for every
signer, but it will increase the effort to verify the signature
one by one with the number of signers. To avoid these
difficulties, the multi-signature schemes are adopted in a
way that each signer prepares their different signature on
the same message and sends to the collector. After
receiving all signatures from every signer, the collector
coordinates the entire signature and prepares a single
multi-signature. The collector sends the final
multi-signature with the message to the verifier, who then
verifies the received message and multi-signature. The
digital multi-signature schemes are extensively used in
∗ Corresponding

many applications including electronic contract sign,
decision making processes, petitions, work-flow systems,
etc.
In last two decades, several multi-signature
schemes [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] have been proposed
by the researchers such as (1) ID-based multi-signature
scheme using RSA algorithm, (2) ID-based
multi-signature scheme using elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC), (3) Multi-signature scheme based on
certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) and
ECC, (4) Multi-signature scheme based on the
generalized conic curves over Zn . Most of them are based
on the difficulties to solve integer factorization problem
(IFP) and discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Several
ID-based multi-signature schemes using RSA have been
proposed [8], [9], [10], [11], most of them are vulnerable
against different attacks such as forgery attack, active
attack, etc. [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. However, ID-based
multi-signature scheme using elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) is based on the difficulties of solving the elliptic
curve
discrete
logarithm
problem
(ECDLP) [17], [18], [19] shows the same level of security
performance with less bit size key, but unfortunately all of
the schemes are broken [14], [20], [21].
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The multi-signature scheme can be categorized into
two types: sequential multi-signature [7], [10] and
broadcast multi-signature [5], [6], [7], [8], [22]. In the
former scheme, each signer computes a partial
multi-signature and forwards to the next successive signer
for further signing, i.e., ith signer generates the partial
multi-signature based on the partial multi-signature
received from the (i − 1)th signer. At the end of signing
process, the last signer computes the final multi-signature
on behalf of all signers, and this can be verified by
verifier. However, the sequential approach is not efficient
in many applications since the time taken for
multi-signature generation and verification is linearly
depends on the number of signers. In the latter scheme,
the message issuer broadcasts the same message to the
signing group, then each signer computes their individual
signature and sends them to the collector. Now the
collector generates the final multi-signature, and sends it
to the verifier for verification. Compared with sequential
approach, broadcast approach reduces communication
and computation costs.
In 2009, Lin et al. [22] proposed a broadcast digital
multi-signature scheme on generalized conic curves over
Zn and its security is based on the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP). Design and implementations of
cryptographic tools using conic curve is easier than
elliptic curve [23]. Lin et al. claimed that their scheme
can prevent forgery attack [8] and extraction of signer’s
secret pairs is infeasible. In this paper, it is proved that
Lin et al.’s scheme is no longer secured against private
key extraction attack, insider forgery attack and outsider
forgery attack. In private key extraction attack, an
adversary can compute signer’s secret keys using the
technique used to solve the linear Diophantine equation.
In insider forgery attack, a malicious signer, who belongs
to the signing group, can generate a forged signature on
behalf of other signers. In outsider forgery attack, an
adversary, who does not belong to the signing group, can
generate a forged multi-signature δ ∗ from a valid
multi-signature δ on the same message m without
knowing the secret keys of all signers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we reviewed Lin et al.’s digital multi-signature
scheme. The proposed three attacks on Lin et al.’s scheme
are described in Section 3. Finally, some concluding
remarks are given in Section 4.

collector organizes these received signatures and prepares
a final single signature, which is to be sent to the verifier
for verification. A list of notations used in the Lin’s
multi-signature scheme is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Notations used in Lin et al.’s multi-signature scheme
Notation
Meaning
r, s
Two large primes number such that p + 1 = 2r,
q + 1 = 2s, p, q two integers
A finite field
Fp
Zn
The residue class ring modulo n
C p (a, b)
The conic curve over Zn
Rn (a, b, c) Generalized conic curve over Zn
H(·)
One-way secure hash function
Ui
The ith user of a group
di
The ith user private key

The whole scheme consists of four phases: System
initialization phase, Signing phase, Collecting phase and
Verification phase. Now we describe briefly each phase as
given below.

2.1 System initialization phase
Step 1.Choose a generalized conic curve Rn (a, b, c),
n = pq and p + 1 = 2r, q + 1 = 2s,
|Rn (a, b, c)| = (p + 1)(q + 1) = 2rs, r and s are two
large primes.
Step 2.Consider a base point G = (xG , yG ) on Rn (a, b, c)
of order Nn = lcm{|R p (a, b, c)|, |Rq (a, b, c)| =
(p + 1)(q + 1) = 2rs}.
Step 3.Every group member Ui (i = 1, 2, · · · , k) sends their
public key Qi = di G to the collector.
Step 4.The system publishes the parameters hn, G, Qi ,
H(·), Rn (a, b, c)i as public.

2.2 Signing phase
Step 1.Each Ui selects a random number ki ∈ ZN∗ n .
Step 2.Each Ui calculates Ci = ki G = (xi , yi ).
Step 3.Each Ui calculates δi = ki − di H(m)(mod Nn ). If
δi = 0, then go to Step 1. Therefore (ci , δi ) is the
signature on the message m of the group member Ui
and send it to the collector.

2 Review of Lin et al.’s multi-signature
scheme
2.3 Collecting phase
This section reviews Lin et al.’s multi-signature scheme
on generalized conic curves over Zn . In this scheme, the
sender broadcasts the message to each signer
simultaneously. Then each signer produces their
individual signature on the received message, and sent it
to the collector. After receiving all the signatures, the

Step 1.The collector received all (ci , δi ) from the group
n

n

i=1

i=1

members and calculates C = ∑ Ci and δ = ∑ δi .
Step 2.The collector sends the final multi-signature (C, δ )
of the message m to the verifier.
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2.4 Verification phase
n

Step 1.The verifier computes Q = ∑ Qi .
i=1

Step 2.Choose u1 = δ and u2 = H(m), computes u1 G ⊕
u2 Q = C∗ .
Step 3.The verifier accepts the signature (C, δ ) as valid
multi-signature if C∗ = C, otherwise reject the
signature.

3 Cryptanalysis of Lin et al.’s multi-signature
scheme
In this section, the cryptanalysis of the Lin et al.’s
multi-signature scheme is done and three relevant attacks
such as extraction of secret pairs, insider forgery attack
and outsider forgery attack have been identified. Each of
them is now discussed.

3.1 Private key extraction attack
As stated earlier, each signer in Lin et al.’s scheme
computes δi = ki − di H(m)(mod Nn ) and generates
individual signature (ci , δi ), which is found to be solvable
to extract the signer’s secret keys based on the technique
used to solve the linear Diophantine equation [24]. The
Theorem 1 given below explains the technique to solve
the Liner Diophantine Equation.
Theorem 1.Any linear Diophantine equation ax + by = c,
where a and b are two integer coefficients, has an integer
solution if and only if l = gcd(a, b) divides c, and then the
general solutions for x and y are x = uc+bt
and y = vc+at
l
l ,
where t, u, v are integers such that au + bv = l holds.
Proof of the proposed attack: Now we will prove the
proposed attack with the help of the Theorem 1. The
expression for δi , which is a part of the ith signer’s
signature, can be rearranged as
ki × 1 + (−H(m))di = δi

(1)

Now on comparing 1 it with ax + by = c, we have a =
1, x = ki , b = −H(m), y = di , c = δi . Since
li = gcd(a, b)
= gcd(1, −H(m))

(2)

and therefore, li divides δi . After putting the values of
a and b in the equation au + bv = l, we have
aui + bvi = 1
⇒ aui + bvi = 1
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⇒ ui − H(m)vi = 1
Now by applying Euclid’s algorithm we get, ui = 1 +
H(m) and vi = 1. The general solutions for ki and di can
be found as

ki = {1 + H(m)}δi − H(m)ti
= δi + (δi − ti )H(m)

(3)

and
di = (vi δi − ti )/l
= δi − t i

[where ti = 0, 1, · · · ]
(4)

Since H(m) and δi are publicly known, then the
attacker by varying ti and using trial and error technique,
can compute the secret pair (ki , di ) of each signer. The
time complexity of the computation is O(n2 ) [25], where
n is the number of bits used to represent the coefficients in
the linear Diophantine equation. Thus the secret pair of
each signer is easily extractable using linear Diophantine
equation.

3.2 Insider forgery attack
The insider forgery attack may be defined as the forging
of the partial signature generated by a valid malicious
signer, which affects the final multi-signature (C, δ ),
generated in the Lin et al.’s multi-signature scheme.
Suppose a valid signer Ui acts as forger and before
signing, collects all Q j and all the pairs
(C j , δ j ), j = 1, 2, · · · , k; j 6= i, and generates its own partial
forged signing values using all of these. The details of
such generation and the proposed insider forgery attack
are described below.
Step 1.User Ui selects a random number as forged private
key, say di∗ and computes the corresponding public
key as Q∗i = di∗ G. Ui instead of sending Q∗i , generates
another forged public key Qi = Q∗i −

k

∑

j=1, j6=i

Q j and

sends the same to the collector.
Step 2.Ui selects a random number ki∗ and computes
Ci∗ = ki∗ G. Then a signature pair can be calculated as
k

∑

Ci = Ci∗ −

δi = δi∗ −

j=1, j6=i
k

∑

j=1, j6=i

C j , δi∗ = ki∗ − di∗ H(m) and

δ j . The pair (Ci , δi ) thus calculated is

sent to the collector.
Step 3.The
collector
multi-signature as

computes

the

common
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3.3 Outsider forgery attack
k

∑ Cj

C=

In this Section, outsider forgery attack on the Lin et al.’s
digital multi-signature scheme is discussed, i.e. an
outsider can generate a forged multi-signature (C∗ , δ ∗ )
corresponding to the valid multi-signature (C, δ ) on a
message m without knowing the secret keys of all signers.
The proposed attack comprises two steps as given below:

j=1

k

∑

= Ci +

Cj

j=1, j6=i
k

k

∑

= Ci∗ −

∑

Cj +

Cj

′

Step 1.An attacker randomly selects a set of integers {k1 ,

j=1, j6=i

j=1, j6=i

= Ci∗

(5)

′

′

k

′

k

j=1

k

∑

δj

j=1, j6=i
k

∑

= δi∗ −

k

∑

δj +

j=1, j6=i

′

i=1

′

Step 2.The attacker calculates the values C∗ = C − C and
′
δ ∗ = δ − k , where (C, δ ), is the intercepted valid
multi-signature, and instead of (C, δ ), the forged
signature (C∗ , δ ∗ ) is sent to the verifier. The validity
of the proposed outsider forgery attack is explained in
the Theorem 3 given below.

∑ δj

= δi +

k

′

i=1

and

δ =

′

k2 , · · · , kk } and computes k = ∑ ki and C = ∑ ki G.

Theorem 3.The forged multi-signature (C∗ , δ ∗ ) generated
by step 1 and step 2 pretends to be a valid multi-signature
for a message m.

δj

j=1, j6=i

= δi∗

(6)

Then the collector sends the forged multi-signature
(C, δ ) = (C∗ , δ ∗ ) for verification.
Theorem 2.For any message m, the forged multi-signature
(C∗ , δ ∗ ) generated by Ui is a valid multi-signature..
Proof.The verifier computes the common public key as

Proof.On receiving the forged multi-signature (C∗ , δ ∗ ), the
verifier carries out the following derivations

δ ∗ G + H(m)Q
k

= (δ − k′ )G + H(m) ∑ Qi
i=1
k

= δ G − k′ G + H(m) ∑ Qi

k

Qi =

∑ Qj

i=1

j=1

=

k

= Qi +

∑

Qj

j=1, j6=i

= Q∗i −

k

i=1

i=1

k

∑ δi G − ∑ ki′ G + H(m) ∑ Qi
i=1

k

=

k

k

∑

k

Qj +

j=1, j6=i

∑

Qj
=

k

=

i=1

k

k

i=1

i=1

i=1

∑ ki G − H(m) ∑ di G − ∑ ki′ G + H(m) ∑ di G

i=1

It shows that the common public key Qi equals to the
forgery public key Q∗i of Ui . Finally, the verifier obtains
the following
C = δ G + H(m)Q
= δ ∗ G + H(m)Q∗
= (ki∗ − di∗ H(m))G + H(m)di∗ G
= ki∗ G − H(m)di∗ G + H(m)di∗ G
= ki∗ G
= Ci∗

i=1

k

k

(7)

k

∑ (ki − H(m)di )G − ∑ ki′ G + H(m) ∑ di G

i=1

j=1, j6=i

= Q∗i

k

k

∑ ki G − ∑ ki′ G

i=1

= C −C
= C∗

i=1

′

(9)

Therefore the forged multi-signature (C∗ , δ ∗ ) can not
be detected by the verifier. Hence the theorem is proved.

(8)

Since C = Ci∗ , so the forged multi-signature (Ci∗ , δi∗ )
generated by Ui , is the valid multi-signature for message
m. This completes the proof of the theorem.

4 Conclusion
In this paper, the authors presented three attacks on the
Lin et al.’s digital multi-signature scheme and they are
extraction of the signer’s secret pair, insider forgery attack
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and the outsider forgery attack. It has been shown that an
attacker can computes secret pairs of the signers using a
technique of solving the linear Diophantine equation. It
has also been shown that any malicious signer can
generate a forged signature that reflects the signature final
multi-signature. Finally, it has been proved that the Lin et
al.’s digital multi-signature is also forgeable by an
outsider.
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